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Society clearly benefits when businesses
compete. Competition forces firms to innovate
and adopt least-cost methods of production. It
rewards efficient producers and punishes ineffi-
cient ones. As such, competition is a key to eco-
nomic prosperity in a market economy.
The jury is still out on the social benefits
of government competition, however. On one
side of the debate are economists who argue
that competition encourages governments to
allocate resources efficiently and limits the fief-
building inefficiencies of governmental bureau-
crats. (For seminal articles, see Tiebout 1956
and Brennan and Buchanan 1980.) On the other
side are economists who argue that competition
among governments amounts to little more than
a zero-sum game in which governments squan-
der resources chasing after mobile firms and
“race to the bottom” in providing social services
(for examples, see Burstein and Rolnick 1995
and the discussion in Oates 1999).
Given the competing theories, the social
impact of government competition becomes an
empirical question. Not surprisingly, a large
economics literature has sprung up to explore
the premise that governments facing intense
competitive pressure from other service
providers behave differently than do govern-
ments facing little or no competition.
1 This lit-
erature defines competitive pressure broadly 
to encompass not only horizontal competition
among comparable governments or pieces of
governments, but also vertical competition
among different levels of government and exter-
nal competition between public and private ser-
vice providers. For example, when providing
police services a typical city government can be
viewed as competing horizontally with the
police departments in other city governments;
vertically with the county sheriff, state highway
patrol, and Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
externally with home security firms and private
detective agencies.
The three most important government be-
haviors that have been studied in the context of
competition are government size, service quality,
and productivity. Unfortunately, the existing lit-
erature does little to settle the debate. Only the
literature on primary and secondary education
provides clear and convincing evidence that
competition influences government behavior.
COMPETITION AND GOVERNMENT SIZE
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that
bureaucrats have a self-aggrandizing interest in
big government that can be at least partially
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controlled by competition among governments.
Their Leviathan theory predicts (among other
things) that governments will be largest where
competitive discipline is weakest. On the other
hand, Anderson and Tollison (1988) argue that
monopoly governments may restrict their out-
put to earn economic rents, implying that com-
petition could be associated with desirable in-
creases in government size. In addition, Oates
(1985, 1989) observes that fragmented govern-
ments could be too small to take advantage of
economies of scale and, therefore, that the pub-
lic sector could be larger where there are many
small governments, despite presumably more
competition among governments.
A substantial empirical literature has
sprung up to explore the relationship between
competition and government size. In this litera-
ture, government size is typically measured as
tax revenues or government spending, deflated
by a measure of population, personal income,
or gross area product.
2 Researchers generally do
not distinguish between governments that are
larger because they provide many different ser-
vices and governments that are larger because
they provide large quantities of any given ser-
vice. However, a number of researchers partially
address this issue of governmental scope by dif-
ferentiating between general-purpose govern-
ments (like counties and municipalities) and
special-purpose governments (like school dis-
tricts). While variations in the size of general-
purpose governments could reflect variations in
the scope of government activity, variations in
the size of special-purpose governments proba-
bly do not.
The literature falls roughly into two
camps—studies of the size of the public sector
and studies of the size of individual govern-
ments. The public-sector literature examines the
relationship between the degree of competition
within a geographic area and the sum of gov-
ernment activity within that area. For example,
it might relate the degree of competition among
all governments within a county to the aggre-
gate spending of all state, local, and national
governments within that county. The unit of
observation is a market for government services
rather than any particular government.
In contrast, the individual governments lit-
erature examines the relationship between the
degree of competition in a geographic area and
the size of individual government jurisdictions
within that area. For example, this literature
might relate the spending of county govern-
ments to the degree of competition in their
respective metropolitan areas. The unit of ob-
servation is a specific government like a city or
school district.
Size of the Public Sector
Public sector size has been examined na-
tionally, regionally, and locally. As a general rule,
the Leviathan hypothesis receives its strongest
support from analyses at the local level.
Oates (1985), Heil (1991), and Anderson
and Van Den Berg (1998) use cross-country data
on nations to examine the relationship between
competition and the size of the public sector.
They treat the central government’s share of
total government activity as a measure of com-
petitive pressure. Assuming that spending (or
revenues) is the relevant measure of market
share and that governments compete vertically
as well as horizontally, their approach is analo-
gous to measuring competition with a single-
firm concentration ratio. None of these re-
searchers finds any evidence at the national
level that competition affects the size of gov-
ernment.
Studies at the state or provincial level sug-
gest more of a relationship between competi-
tion and government size. Oates (1985) and
Grossman (1989) find no correlation between
the aggregate number of governments in a state
and the size of its public sector, and Oates
(1985), Di Matteo (1995), and Nelson (1986)
find no relationship between the size of the
nonfederal public sector and the state or
province’s share of that market (another form 
of single-firm concentration ratio). However,
when Nelson (1986, 1987) distinguishes be-
tween general-purpose and special-purpose
governments, he finds evidence that state and
local government is larger in states that have
fewer general-purpose governments per capita.
Furthermore, although Nelson finds no such
relationship for special-purpose districts, Kenny
and Schmidt (1994) and Bell (1988) find evi-
dence that the public education sector is larger
in states with relatively few school districts (per
student in the Kenny and Schmidt study, per
mile in the Bell study).
Eberts and Gronberg (1988) and Zax
(1989) replicate Nelson’s analysis at the local
level. Zax focuses on counties, while Eberts and
Gronberg examine metropolitan areas as well as
counties. Both find evidence that competition
among general-purpose governments reduces
the size of the local public sector. Both also find
that an increased number of special-purpose
governments increases the size of the local pub-
lic sector, an effect they attribute to a failure to
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berg (1990) reach similar conclusions when they
extend their analysis of metropolitan areas to
differentiate between suburban governments,
central cities, and other jurisdictions.
Hoxby (1994a, b) also examines the size
of the local public sector in metropolitan areas,
but she restricts her attention to the education
submarket. As in analyses at the state level by
Kenny and Schmidt (1994) and Bell (1988), she
finds that average per-pupil spending is sub-
stantially higher where the public education
sector is highly concentrated (Hoxby 1994b).
She also concludes that increased external com-
petition from private schools reduces the size of
the public school system, but only because it
reduces the number of public school students
(Hoxby 1994a). Hoxby finds no relationship
between private school competition and aver-
age per-pupil spending.
Size of Individual Governments
As a general rule, competition does not
appear to limit the size of individual jurisdic-
tions. Forbes and Zampelli (1989) find that
county governments are larger in metropolitan
areas with more competing county govern-
ments. Similarly, Santerre (1991) finds that city
governments are larger in metropolitan areas
with more cities. Eberts and Gronberg (1990)
find that central cities spend less on fire, police,
parks, and sanitation in metropolitan areas with
more municipalities (suburbs and central cities)
but find no such distinction when size is meas-
ured by local tax revenues. Schneider (1989)
finds a weakly negative relationship between
municipal employment and competition, and 
no significant relationship between municipal
wages and competition. Brokaw, Gale, and Merz
(1995) conclude that school districts facing
strong private-sector competition spend less per
pupil than other school districts, but their evi-
dence is not fully persuasive because in their
study low public school spending may be a
cause rather than a consequence of private
school enrollment.
Taken as a whole, the evidence on com-
petition and government size is best described
as inconsistent. There seems to be an important
distinction between general-purpose govern-
ments and special-purpose governments.
Analyses at both the state and local level sug-
gest that competition among general-purpose
governments reduces the size of the aggregate
public sector, while competition among special-
purpose governments may increase it. Re-
searchers who examine the size of the public
sector’s component jurisdictions find just the
opposite, however; competition is associated with
increases in the size of general-purpose govern-
ments. Meanwhile, analyses of the most com-
mon form of special-purpose government—
public schools—find that competition limits
government spending. While these inconsisten-
cies suggest that competition is not systemati-
cally related to government size, they also sup-
port Brown and Saving’s (1999) theoretical
conclusion that government size may be a poor
indicator of suboptimal government behavior.
COMPETITION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICES
While the previously discussed literature
explores competition’s effects on government
budgets, a complementary literature explores its
effects on the services financed by those bud-
gets. However, both the quantity and quality of
government services can be hard to measure,
particularly when governments are trying to
accomplish multiple objectives. Therefore, the
literature on government services is limited
almost exclusively to studies of the one govern-
ment function for which there is substantial data
on outcomes—primary and secondary educa-
tion. The literature strongly suggests that com-
petition enhances public school quality.
A number of researchers have examined
the effects on student performance of competi-
tion among school districts. In all cases, the
researchers measure competition with a Her-
findahl index of enrollments.
3 Zanzig (1997)
finds evidence that increased competition
among public school districts enhanced student
test scores in California; Borland and Howsen
(1992, 1993, 1996) report similar results for
Kentucky.
4 Hoxby’s (1994b) analysis of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth suggests
that students who attended high school in com-
munities with more competition among public
schools subsequently earned higher wages,
scored higher on standardized tests, and com-
pleted more years of schooling.
Dee (1998) and Hoxby (1994a) examine
the effects of competition from private schools.
Both measure private school competition as the
private share of educational enrollment in the
county and use instrumental variables tech-
niques to reflect the possible endogeneity of
private school enrollment. Both also use the
county’s religious composition as the primary
instrument for private school enrollment. Dee
examines the effects of competition on average
graduation rates, while Hoxby examines com-
petition’s effects on educational attainment, grad-
uation rates, test scores, and student wages. In5 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2000
all cases, the researchers find that student out-
comes are better in areas with more competition
from the private sector.
COMPETITION AND GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY
The public sector’s productivity has re-
ceived enormous attention in the economics lit-
erature, but only a few researchers have formally
related the degree of public-sector efficiency to
the intensity of the competitive environment. In
general, this modest literature finds that local
governments facing intense competitive pres-
sure use their resources more efficiently than
local governments facing less competition.
Grossman, Mavros, and Wassmer (1999)
examine the relationship between competition
and efficiency for the central cities of 49 U.S.
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Arguing
that an efficient city government will maximize
property values, they use frontier estimation
techniques and panel data to measure the ex-
tent to which aggregate city property values are
less than maximal. Their estimation technique
allows the deviations from the property-value
frontier to be a function of several factors, in-
cluding the degree of horizontal government
competition. They measure competition as the
number of cities in the MSA, the average popu-
lation of those cities, and the number of U.S.
cities in the central city’s census population
group. They find that central cities move closer
to the property-value frontier (that is, become
more technically efficient) as the number and
average population of competing suburban
cities increase.
Hayes, Razzolini, and Ross (1998) employ
a two-step procedure to examine the behavior
of Illinois municipalities. In the first step, they
estimate efficiency measures for municipalities,
using proxies for police and fire services as the
outputs. In the second step, they regress the
efficiency measures on a set of municipal char-
acteristics, including whether the jurisdiction is
a Chicago suburb and whether it is urban,
which they interpret as indicators of the degree
of competitive pressure facing local bureau-
crats. They find that Chicago suburbs are less
wasteful than other governments in Illinois, a
factor they attribute to enhanced competition
for residents.
The remaining literature examines compe-
tition’s effects on the productivity of the U.S.
public school system. The evidence suggests
that increased competition—regardless of the
source—enhances the productivity of public
schools. Husted and Kenny (1996) estimate effi-
ciency frontiers for the educational system in
each state and find that the school system is
much less efficient in those states below a
threshold number of school districts per capita.
Grosskopf et al. (1999, 2000) estimate efficiency
frontiers for urban Texas school districts and
find evidence that school-district inefficiency is
substantially higher in metropolitan areas with
less competition for enrollment (both public
and private). Barrow and Rouse (2000) use dif-
ferent empirics but the same theoretical model
as Grossman, Mavros, and Wassmer (1999) to
examine the effect of school-district spending
on property values. They conclude that school
districts spend less efficiently in areas with less
competition from other public schools.
In terms of external competition, Dun-
combe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997) find that the
cost efficiency of New York school districts is
lower where private school enrollment is
higher. However, because they do not treat pri-
vate school enrollment as endogenous, their
analysis may suffer from reverse causation
whereby inefficient public schools induce flight
to the private sector. After controlling for the
possible endogeneity of private school enroll-
ment, Dee (1998) and Couch, Shughart, and
Williams (1993) find that increased competition
from private schools improves public school
outcomes, holding expenditures constant.
5
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As the survey above illustrates, a substan-
tial literature examines the premise that govern-
ments facing intense competitive pressure from
other service providers behave differently than
do governments facing little or no competition.
However, the literature suffers from two signifi-
cant weaknesses that make it difficult to draw
firm conclusions from the collected research.
First, the literature lacks a consistent defi-
nition of the market for government services.
Some researchers use national, state, or county
boundaries to define the market.
6 In these stud-
ies, governments are assumed to compete with
all other governments inside the designated
boundary but not with those outside the lines.
Such an approach is problematic for a number
of reasons. For example, while it may be plau-
sible that competition across national borders
was negligible in the past, today’s world of
mobile capital and labor makes such an
assumption less defensible. The assumption that
governments do not compete across state or
county lines is implausible on its face. Further-
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governments within a small geographic unit like
a county compete with equal intensity with one
another, it is hard to argue that all governments
within a large state or nation compete with one
another in the short term. In most cases, a sub-
urb of Dallas competes intensely with another
Dallas suburb but only negligibly with a suburb
of El Paso. Therefore, while all the governments
may compete with one another in a geographi-
cally compact state like Connecticut, such a
market definition is unlikely to fit properly for
large states like Texas and California. Market
concentration estimates based on geographic
notions that fit some regions but not others will
introduce systematic measurement error that
makes the whole analysis suspect.
Other researchers view only contiguous
jurisdictions as relevant competitors (see, for
example, Schneider 1989). Such studies proba-
bly define the market too narrowly and are par-
ticularly susceptible to spatial omitted variables
masquerading as competition. For example, all
governments near a prison may spend more on
police than other governments.
Most consistent with models of competi-
tion through factor migration are studies that
use labor markets to define markets for gov-
ernment services (for examples, see Grosskopf 
et al. 1999, 2000; Eberts and Gronberg 1990;
Hoxby 1994b; or Grossman, Mavros, and Wassmer
1999). Unfortunately, such studies tend to focus
exclusively on horizontal competition with no
regard for vertical competition among govern-
ments. While vertical competition may be neg-
ligible in certain markets (such as education 
services), it is potentially important in other
markets (such as public safety).
Another dimension of the market defini-
tion dilemma is the question of competition
from the private sector. Although governments
compete with the private sector to provide hos-
pital care, health insurance, utilities, business
financing, roads, security and detective services,
and a myriad of other services, school districts
are the only governments for which the litera-
ture examines external competition.
7 The lack of
evidence on the effects of external competition
for noneducational services would be less trou-
bling if the literature did not demonstrate so
clearly that private-sector competition has a
substantial influence on the one government
that has been studied—public schools. 
The lack of consensus on market defini-
tion foreshadows the second weakness in the
literature—idiosyncratic measures of competi-
tion. The most common measure is the number
of governments deflated by some measure of
population (for examples, see Oates 1985;
Grossman 1989; Nelson 1986, 1987; Bell 1988;
or Grossman, Mavros, and Wassmer 1999), but
numerous studies use direct measures of market
concentration like Herfindahl indexes or con-
centration ratios (Eberts and Gronberg 1990;
Borland and Howsen 1992, 1993, 1996; Hoxby
1994a, b; or Grosskopf et al. 1999, 2000). Studies
of competition in education base their estimates
of the Herfindahl index or concentration ratio
on enrollment shares, but expenditure shares
are the name of the game outside of educa-
tion (for example, Eberts and Gronberg 1990).
Schneider (1989) measures competitive intensity
using the number of contiguous jurisdictions
and the standard deviations of expenditures and
taxes for all cities in the metropolitan area. 
He argues that if all the jurisdictions offer the
same bundle of taxes and services, there is no
effective competition. Grossman, Mavros, and
Wassmer (1999) use measures of jurisdictional
size to capture the opposite idea—if city gov-
ernments are too dissimilar, they do not com-
pete. Borland and Howsen (1992, 1993, 1996)
and Grosskopf et al. (1999, 2000) treat competi-
tion from public and private schools symmetri-
cally using a Herfindahl index, but all other
studies of the impact of private-sector competi-
tion use the private enrollment share as the
measure of competition.
Regardless of their metric for competitive
pressure, virtually all the studies treat market
structure as exogenous. The few exceptions
come from the education literature and primar-
ily arise from the obvious interplay between pri-
vate school enrollment and public school qual-
ity (see Couch, Shughart, and Williams 1993;
Dee 1998; and Hoxby 1994b). Hoxby (1994b) is
the only researcher to model competition within
the public sector as endogenous. She argues
that jurisdictional boundaries were set histori-
cally following the topography of the land and
that, therefore, topography can provide the
exogenous variation needed for instrumental
variables analysis. For each MSA, she records
the number of “rivers, streams, creeks, inlets
and similar bodies of water whose width
exceeds 75 feet at some point and that extend
at least five miles. They are classified as either
inter-county  ‘rivers’ (where they form county
boundaries) or intra-county ‘rivers’ (where a
stretch of water flows inside a county’s bound-
aries).” She then uses the number of inter-
county rivers and the number of intra-county
rivers, together with area demographics, to gen-
erate an instrumental variable for the Herfindahl
index. She provides strong evidence that it can7 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2000
be statistically inappropriate to treat market con-
centration as exogenous. As a general rule,
Hoxby finds that when compared with ordinary
least squares (OLS) analysis, an instrumental
variables approach yields substantially larger
estimates of market concentration’s effects on
school-district size or student outcomes. How-
ever, in none of the cases she reports for com-
parison would a naive, OLS analysis have led a
researcher to a conclusion other than Hoxby’s
about the direction and significance of the
effects of competition.
An equally important problem of endo-
geneity arises from the possibility that there is a
critical level of competition such that govern-
ments in markets on one side of the critical level
would benefit from increased competition while
those on the other side would not. All
researchers who report looking for such a
switching point have found one (see Grosskopf
et al. 1999, 2000; Borland and Howsen 1993;
and Zanzig 1997). For example, Grosskopf et al.
(1999) estimate that school districts in metro-
politan areas with a Herfindahl index above
0.27 (equivalent to a market with just over four
equally large firms) are more than twice as
allocatively inefficient as school districts in less
concentrated markets. Unfortunately, as with
the question of the general endogeneity of mar-
ket concentration, this hypothesis has been
explored only in the context of public educa-
tion. Therefore, it is not clear whether the issue
generalizes to other types of government.
An ill-defined market, together with incon-
sistent and potentially inappropriate measuring
sticks, raises the strong possibility that competi-
tion has been mismeasured in much of the lit-
erature on competition and government.
Furthermore, there has been little empirical
analysis of the contestability of the government
market, of the extent to which the electoral
process provides a substitute for competition
from other government service providers (see
the box entitled “Political Competition”), or of
the extent to which variations in the regulatory
environment selectively limit government
responses to competitive pressure. Finally, for
various reasons, the literature on government
and competition has become overly concen-
trated in a single governmental function—edu-
cation. Clearly, much work remains to be done
on this issue.
Most of the work on government
responses to competition has focused on the
market for education, and here the literature is
strikingly consistent—competition improves
public schools. Almost across the board, re-
searchers have found that school spending is
lower, academic outcomes are better, and
school-district efficiency is higher where parents
have more choice in their children’s educational
provider. Furthermore, competitive benefits
emerge regardless of whether the competitor is
a private school or another public school. Thus,
the literature offers support for the notion that
increased school competition—fostered either
by vouchers or charter schools—would improve
the public school system. Additional research
will be necessary, however, before this conclu-
sion can be extended to the remainder of the
public sector.
Political Competition
While competition among government service providers has received most of
the attention in the empirical economics literature, a modest, parallel literature
explores the effects of competition for the political control of governments. In the
political competition literature, citizens are usually treated as immobile, making the
market for political control very different from the market for government services.
Oversimplifying slightly, one can say that the political competition literature deals with
voting, while the rest of the government competition literature deals with voting with
your feet.
The political competition literature has two main strands—voter monitoring and
political concentration. Researchers have posited that governments that are difficult
for voters to monitor or that are controlled by powerful political parties behave differ-
ently than do governments facing more political competition.The empirical literature
generally supports this perspective.
Although voter monitoring is not directly observable, rough proxies for increased
monitoring are associated with smaller and more efficient governments. For example,
Oates (1985) argues that centralized governments are more difficult for citizens to
monitor, and, consistent with this perspective, researchers typically find that the public
sector is bigger where the federal government is a larger share of total government.
For examples, see Marlow (1988), Joulfaian and Marlow (1991), and Grossman and
West (1994). For a counterexample, see Grossman’s (1992) analysis of Australia.
Other proxies for monitoring activity include tax rates, population densities, home
ownership rates, and the educational attainment of citizens. Such proxies partially
explain variations in the efficiencies of police departments (Davis and Hayes 1993;
Hayes and Wood 1995; and Hayes, Razzolini, and Ross 1998) and public schools
(Grosskopf et al. 2000 and Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 1997).
Concentrated political power is usually associated with monopolistic behavior,
although there is some debate as to whether monopolistic governments are neces-
sarily nonoptimal (see Brown and Saving 1999). For example, Anderson and Tollison
(1988) and Rogers and Rogers (1995) find evidence that governments are smaller in
states where power is concentrated in one political party. Baber and Sen (1986) find
that states with concentrated political power tend to have less of an increase in debt-
financed spending immediately prior to an election. Lipford and Yandle (1990) find
that state governments make up a larger share of the public sector if a single party
controls a larger share of the state government, a pattern they attribute to cartelizing
by state legislatures.
Although voting can substitute for voting with your feet, few empirical studies of
competition among government service providers explicitly control for variations in
political competition.Those studies that incorporate political competition do so
through measures of monitoring rather than political concentration (see Grossman,
Mavros, and Wassmer 1999; Grosskopf et al. 2000; Hayes, Razzolini, and Ross
1998; and Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 1997).The studies tend to find that both
types of competition enhance government efficiency.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 8
NOTES
Thanks to Stephen P. A. Brown, Kathy J. Hayes, 
Jason Saving, and Pia Orrenius for helpful comments.
Of course, any remaining errors are my own.
1 A parallel literature explores political competition (see
box on page 7). Other literatures explore government
competition less directly. For example, a substantial 
literature uses housing values to examine whether 
governments are efficient (see Oates 1969, Hoyt 1990,
Taylor 1995, and Brueckner 1982), while another litera-
ture explores the interdependence of government
decisionmaking (see Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid 1999;
Case, Rosen, and Hines 1993; Staley and Blair 1995;
and Blair and Staley 1995).
2 Schneider (1989) and Joulfaian and Marlow (1991)
use government employment per capita to measure
government size. Schneider also examines the rela-
tionship between competition and public-sector
wages. His wage analyses are inconclusive.
3 In this context, the Herfindahl index is the sum of
squared enrollment shares.
4 Borland and Howsen include competition from private
schools in their Herfindahl index. As such, the index
measures the effects of competition without regard to
whether the competition is horizontal or external.
5 However, Newmark (1995) examines the robustness of
the results in Couch, Shughart, and Williams (1993)
and concludes that their analysis is fragile. See Couch
and Shughart (1995) for their response.
6 See, for example, Oates 1985; Nelson 1986, 1987; 
Zax 1989; Heil 1991; Kenny and Schmidt 1994; 
Di Matteo 1995; Bell 1988; Borland and Howsen 1992,
1993, 1996; Zanzig 1997; or Grossman 1989.
7 A substantial literature compares the relative efficiency
of public and private service providers but does not
answer the question, Would fostering private competi-
tion improve public service quality, cost, or efficiency?
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